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1 Introduction 
In recent years, the international community has widely
recognised that taxation is crucial in ensuring sustainable
development, the consolidation of democratic institutions,
and in paving the way for independence from foreign aid
in the long run. Despite this increasing attention, low-
and middle-income countries still face many obstacles to
increasing tax revenues, both domestic and international
(for a review, see Moore 2013). On the domestic side, tax
mobilisation is particularly hard when government
transparency and accountability are lacking. While most
European countries have gone through processes of
statebuilding that included bargaining between states and
citizens over revenues, such processes are still at an early
stage in many low-income countries, particularly in Africa.
In the absence of a social contract, whereby citizens pay
taxes and expect the state to provide goods and services
in return, they may not trust the government to use their
resources wisely. This results in low voluntary compliance,
which makes tax mobilisation even harder and more costly
since it requires a higher reliance on coercion. However,
public administrations in many African countries suffer
from capacity constraints related to, amongst others, the
difficulty in recruiting and retaining skilled staff, the low or
inefficient use of modern technologies and the lack of
adequate financial resources. Consequently, they are not
always able to fully monitor taxpayers and to enforce tax
laws. This in turn may further reduce compliance by
fuelling the perception that tax authorities are weak and
do not have the ability to detect and punish evaders.
Therefore, tax compliance is related to many of the
common obstacles to tax mobilisation, such as low
accountability and capacity constraints, and it is one of the
major problems faced by tax administration. 
One way in which the research community can help
governments mobilise additional tax revenue is by
understanding these constraints better and by evaluating
possible ways to overcome them. However, the evaluation
of drivers and constraints to tax compliance suffers from a
number of methodological issues related mainly to the
difficulty of measurement. Obviously, it is difficult to get
honest answers about dishonest behaviour. Still, recent
developments in econometric methods and in the
availability of data have created new opportunities to bring
this field to the frontier of research. On the one hand,
the view that randomisation is a gold standard in applied
economic research, with all its merits and drawbacks, has
contributed to the widespread adoption of more rigorous
methods. On the other hand, the establishment of
revenue authorities (RAs) in many low- and middle-
income countries and the digitalisation of tax records
present a new opportunity to apply such methods in these
countries. In this context, tax experiments can be a tool to
study tax compliance and overcome some of the common
challenges in this area of research, as well as having the
potential to support policymakers by achieving a better
understanding of the drivers of compliance. 
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Tax experiments share the same methodological
foundations of the broader quantitative evaluation
research. To a certain extent, they are located in the
tradition related to randomisation, to which randomised
controlled trials (RCTs) also belong. While randomisation
certainly has merit, one of the most important being
bringing more rigour to quantitative evaluation methods,
it has also attracted criticism (see for example Deaton
2009 and Basu 2013). One of the main criticisms of RCTs
is the external applicability of results and the possibility of
scaling them up from the village to the national level.
Related to this issue, RCTs are criticised for not being able
to give answers to the broad but fundamental questions
that policymakers are interested in. While tax experiments
share some of these drawbacks, they can alleviate the
problem of scalability by using large and nationally
representative data sets. In this sense, they can constitute
cases from which the broader evaluation community can
learn, even if it may not always be possible to apply the
same methods in other sectors. 
The objective of this CDI Practice Paper is to give a
critical assessment of the literature on tax experiments to
date: what the main conceptual, methodological and
data-related challenges are, how they have been tackled,
and practical reflections on how to move forward in low-
and middle-income countries where this type of research
is still underdeveloped. By doing this, it offers a guide for
practitioners on the main challenges in quantitative
research on tax compliance and on the methods used to
tackle them, which may be of interest for evaluation
research more generally. 
2 Critical review of tax experiments:
methods and issues
This section focuses on the most recent tax experiments
(TEs), although this literature dates back a few decades.
While a comprehensive review of early TEs is not provided
here,1 it is useful to highlight a few common traits that lay
the foundations for more recent studies. Initially, tax
experiments were largely carried out in artificial lab
settings that allowed the main variables of interest to be
controlled more easily than in real life or survey-based
research. By doing this, researchers could capture actual
behavioural responses rather than just perceptions on
taxpaying behaviour, which is what surveys typically
capture. The early TEs traditionally focused on economic
elements determining taxpayer behaviour, both in terms
of probability to evade and extent of evasion, by testing
the model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972). This model is
positioned in the tradition of the economics of crime
where dishonest behaviour (in this case, non-compliance)
is determined by the expected returns from tax evasion,
which weight the costs, determined by the probability of
being caught and the sanctions applied; and the gains,
which increase when tax rates and taxable income
increase. These ‘traditional’ factors are still very relevant
today, particularly in low-income countries, where the
capacity to enforce tax laws is still a major problem. In
addition, early TEs also started shedding light on other
factors, such as social norms, moral motives, emotions and
institutions. However, they suffered from clear drawbacks,
most notably the use of students rather than real
taxpayers, small samples and the artificiality of the lab
environment. The latter is particularly important:
participants know they are part of a study, that there are
no real-life consequences to their behaviour, and that they
will not bear the monetary consequences or gains from
their actions. As a result, their behaviour in the lab may
differ from what they would actually do in real life. These
drawbacks made early TEs not totally fit for providing
policy recommendations. 
Most of these drawbacks were addressed by a more recent
stream of research: large-scale field experiments, which
allow for greater realism and are therefore better
positioned to provide policy advice. These studies have
three main characteristics that distinguish them from
previous experiments. Firstly, they are embedded in real
taxpaying situations. Typically, the participants are real
taxpayers who are not aware they are part of a study and
who are observed through the data they release to the tax
administration via their tax returns. Secondly, they involve a
large number of taxpayers that are usually representative of
the whole population, making it easier to translate the
findings into policy at the national level. Thirdly, these
experiments require a close collaboration with the RA, not
only because the data are obtained from tax returns, but
also because it is typically the tax authority that
communicates with taxpayers and potentially influences
their behaviour. Therefore, the interface for taxpayers is the
RA rather than a researcher, thus making the experiment
real for participants. By doing this, large field experiments
can tackle many of the challenges of more traditional TEs,
while still being part of the same tradition. 
Although large-scale field TEs solve many of the
drawbacks identified in previous experiments, they also
present new challenges. While in the lab context it is
possible to observe both real income and reported
income, tax returns only contain information on declared
income without indicating the extent of under-reported
income. This problem can be partially solved by the use of
appropriate research design and econometric techniques
based on the principle of randomisation. Put simply, the
study would start by dividing a given sample of taxpayers
into two groups that are comparable, in that they have
similar characteristics, such as in terms of location,
income, age, employment status, etc. One of the groups
would be used as a control group, while the other (or
others) is ‘treated’ with the intervention that is being
studied. For example, in the typical TE, the treatment is a
letter that the RA sends to taxpayers along with their bill,
which underlines a specific determinant of compliance,
such as the threat of an audit or information about the
social importance of taxpaying. By analysing the changes
in reported income in the two groups before and after
the treatment, the researcher can draw conclusions about
the effects of these treatments on compliance. In this
example, the difference between the changes in reported
income in the control group and treatment group is taken
as indicative of changes in compliance. In other words, if
the treated group increases reported income more than
the control group, keeping other characteristics fixed, this
difference can be attributed to a change in compliance. In
this way, it is possible to draw conclusions about evasion
even if the actual extent of under-reported income
cannot be observed. 
For example, the pioneering study by Slemrod, Blumenthal
and Christian (2001) was based on a sample of 22,368 tax
returns from taxpayers in Minnesota (US). The treatment in
this study was a letter from the Department of Revenue
informing the taxpayer that they had been selected for a
close examination of their tax return, and that if any
irregularities were found, past tax returns would be
scrutinised as well. This treatment increased the perceived
probability of audit, and allowed an analysis of the effect
of threats of audit on compliance. The main result was
that the letters led to a significant increase in reported
income. To gain a more nuanced understanding of how
this effect came about, Slemrod et al. stratified their
sample along two dimensions: income (low, middle, high)
and opportunity to evade2 (low, high). They found that the
strongest effect occurred for low- and middle-income
taxpayers with high opportunity to evade. For high-income
taxpayers, there seemed to be a perverse effect, whereby
the letter reduced rather than increased reported income.
One possible explanation of this is that high-income
taxpayers can afford professional tax consultants, and can
therefore find legal ways to reduce their taxable income in
response to the letter. Similar effects are highly likely in
many low-income countries where high-quality tax advisers
are scarce and only a small portion of the population,
namely rich individuals and large firms, can afford to pay
for their services. 
Blumenthal, Christian and Slemrod (1998) used a very
similar design, focusing on the effect of moral appeals to
stimulate voluntary compliance, but they failed to find
support that such appeals matter for compliance. Again,
the sample was stratified along the dimensions of income
and opportunity to evade. Torgler (2004) confirmed this
finding in a field experiment in collaboration with a local
tax administration in Switzerland, expecting that the
effect of moral appeals and social norms might be higher
in a tight and localised community. However, he found
that moral suasion has almost no effect on compliance.
Similarly, Fellner, Sausgruber and Traxler (2013) studied
evasion in the context of TV licences in Austria.
They found that while threat letters had a strong effect,
moral and social appeals did not affect compliance. These
results are echoed in Castro and Scartascini (2013) in the
case of property taxes in a municipality of Argentina. In
line with the results of Slemrod et al. (2001), they argue
that the effect of their messages are likely to be
heterogeneous across different groups, based for instance
on past compliance behaviour and wealth. For example,
their equity message did not affect those who did not
comply in the past, while it affected compliance negatively
for those who did, as they might have revised their
perception on evasion upwards after the message. 
However, before drawing conclusions about the lack of
effectiveness of moral factors, at least three caveats are
due. Firstly, it is important to remember that lab studies3
in the early TE tradition have shown the importance of
moral and social factors. Secondly, experiments can only
draw conclusions on the effect of a specific treatment in
a specific context, not on whether moral appeals are
effective generally. For example, Ali, Fjeldstad and Sjursen
(2014) demonstrate, using survey data, that there is a link
between compliance and service delivery, but it depends
on specific services that differ across countries. Thirdly,
while moral and social factors almost certainly affect the
level of compliance, they may have a smaller effect on
variations in compliance. The reason is that the latter relies
mostly on changes in behaviour of those who do not
comply, and decide to start doing so in response to one of
the treatments. As suggested by the results of Castro and
Scartascini (2013), evaders are likely to care less about
moral and social factors, therefore being potentially less
responsive to moral appeals. Indeed, some research has
revealed a strong and positive effect of messages about
social norms and public goods. For example, Hallsworth
et al. (2014) find that these factors affect payments of
outstanding taxes due to the RA. Notably, by looking at
the timeliness of outstanding payments, the authors are
able to circumvent the issue of not being able to observe
evasion. In addition, Bott et al. (2014) confirm that moral
appeals matter in the case of Norway, where they result
in doubling the average foreign income reported with
respect to a base letter. 
Another way to get round the problem of studying
compliance when true income is not observed is to use
audit data. By doing this, it is possible to get a more
accurate measure of under-reporting, as declared income
would be known from the tax return and real income
from the audit. This method is used by Kleven et al. (2011)
in studying a random sample of 42,800 taxpayers from
Denmark, using data from both tax returns and
randomised audits. First of all, the authors show that tax
compliance is generally high despite relatively high tax
rates. While this may be expected in the context of
northern European countries, the situation may be very
different in low-income countries. In fact, an important
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use of administrative tax data is to start shedding light on
and quantifying differences in levels of compliance across
countries as a preliminary step to the analysis of its
drivers. The treatment used in Kleven et al. (2011) was a
letter threatening an audit and the sample was stratified
according to the reporting environment. In particular, the
authors separated those who self-report their income and
those who are subject to third-party reporting. They
found that the letter had a positive effect on compliance,
which was entirely driven by changes in self-reported
income. Therefore, they conclude that taxpayers comply
because they are unable to cheat (due to third-party
reporting), rather than unwilling to do so. Pomeranz
(2013) underlines the importance of information and
reporting systems in the case of the VAT in Chile. She
finds that the response to an increased probability of audit
amongst firms is largely driven by transactions that are not
covered by the paper trail generated by the VAT, namely
sales to final consumers rather than transactions between
firms. This is because the VAT paper trail makes it easier
to detect evasion and therefore has a deterrence effect. 
3 Opportunities and challenges of TEs in
low- and middle-income countries
From the overview of TEs provided in Section 2 emerges a
notable gap regarding low- and middle-income countries.
Some studies are ongoing in such countries and the results
have not yet been published, for instance the study in
Montevideo discussed below. In addition, it is important to
recognise that some studies have been successfully
completed and published. This is the case in particular of
studies from Latin America, including for example
Pomeranz (2013) on Chile and Castro and Scartascini (2013)
on Argentina, with some examples also from Asia (such as
Khan, Khwaja and Olken 2014). Nonetheless, this gap
reflects an actual lack of evidence, particularly in Africa.
There is currently no large-scale field experiment available
for any African country, although researchers have been
able to use administrative data on a few occasions. This
section outlines the main opportunities and challenges in
filling this gap, and argues that the main challenges can be
overcome through research design and a good
understanding of the local context. 
Opportunities
As previously mentioned, TEs have several methodological
advantages. First of all, they can tackle one of the
common scepticisms around randomisation, namely the
issue of scaling up. Field TEs are often carried out using a
large sample of taxpayers that is nationally representative,
as opposed to smaller scale experiments that may only
involve one or more villages in a specific region of a
country. By doing this, field TEs are better positioned to
influence policy because the results are more readily
scaled up to the national level. Secondly, TEs provide the
opportunity to analyse compliance even if evasion is not
directly observable. Data from randomised audits offer the
most accurate measure of the extent of evasion, but it is
not always available. However, even by relying only on tax
returns data, it is possible to draw conclusions about
compliance by observing differences in reporting
behaviour between the treatment and control groups. This
method is particularly suitable in a situation where it is
virtually impossible to change the actual conditions, such
as the tax rate, the actual probability of audit, or
sanctions, for a selected group of people. However, by
changing perceptions about the probability of detection
or about the equity of the tax system through the use of
letters, one can observe responses in compliance. The
underlying idea is that taxpayers’ behaviour does not only
depend on changes in actual factors, but also on their
perceptions and on information available to them (Castro
and Scartascini 2014). 
These methodological advantages are made possible by the
availability of data from tax returns. Notably, the use of
administrative data also allows the production of rigorous
studies with much lower budgets than the typical RCT,
since RAs routinely collect these data. In this sense, TEs are
a low-cost tool to evaluate RA initiatives and to find
effective ways to increase tax revenues. For example, they
can show that a simple and relatively cheap intervention,
such as the ‘threat of audit’ letter, can increase tax liabilities
by 12 per cent (Slemrod et al. 2001). By doing this, TEs can
help tax authorities to disentangle which factors matter
most for increasing compliance, even if in most cases all
factors coexist to various extents. Governments have
different preferences and views on how to improve
compliance, from aggressive enforcement to voluntary
compliance. However, both RAs and taxpayers are likely to
benefit from a system where tax payments are made
voluntarily based on a relation of trust, rather than
coercively at a higher individual and social cost. The
research community can help governments move in that
direction by demonstrating evidence of the behavioural
responses to this multitude of factors, including but also
beyond deterrence. This requires a certain degree of buy-in
from RAs, which underlines once again the importance of
a close collaboration throughout the whole process. 
TEs can also be useful as tools to evaluate specific policy
initiatives that were already undertaken by RAs. For
example, a team of researchers is carrying out an
evaluation of a randomised policy intervention in
Montevideo, Uruguay, where tax holidays are assigned to
‘good’ taxpayers using a lottery system (see Dunning et al.
2014). The initiative is aimed at promoting positive
incentives for compliance, as opposed to the negative
ones that may have occurred after a tax amnesty. Tax
authorities often experiment with similar initiatives and
are constantly looking for new strategies to increase tax
revenues. However, such initiatives are only seldom
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evaluated, thus creating inefficiencies as the RA cannot
clearly distinguish between those that work and those
that do not. In this context, researchers can contribute by
rigorously evaluating existing initiatives and indicating what
the most effective policy options are. In the Montevideo
example, they can establish whether positive incentives are
indeed an effective tool to increase compliance. 
Finally, TEs are a good case for research that can
potentially be both of high academic quality and policy
relevant. The latter is particularly ensured by the close
collaboration required with the RA, which would ideally
have a prominent role from the early stages, particularly in
the research design phase. This close collaboration may
also generate positive effects for the RA, such as hands-
on capacity building on research methods and the
establishment of partnerships with international research
organisations, in addition to using the results to gain a
better understanding of compliance and to identify the
most effective ways to tackle it. 
Challenges
It is likely that the single biggest obstacle in carrying out
this type of research is the lack of data, or the
unwillingness of some RAs to share it. This is particularly
likely to be an issue in Africa, where RAs are relatively
new and often have limited experience of collaboration
with the research community. Moreover, until a few years
ago many RAs in low-income countries did not have the
necessary level of modernisation and digitalisation to
make tax records available. However, today most
countries, including in Africa, have modern RAs that can
certainly benefit from increased collaboration with the
research community and more rigorous evaluations. Some
RAs have embraced this view and started sharing data
with researchers in an anonymised format and in
compliance with all the relevant laws. In the African
context, South Africa is pioneering, with a large research
department within SARS (South Africa Revenue Service)
undertaking a great amount of work using data from tax
records. For example, a recent study looked at the tax
system’s progressivity and its impact on the economy
(Steyn and Jordaan 2012). Similarly, the Ethiopian Revenue
and Customs Authority has recently provided data to
researchers studying the impact of registration machines
on VAT payments. This existing work is stimulating the
interest of other tax administrations, and it may act as a
catalyst for other RAs’ involvement in this field.
Importantly, it shows that the available data can be used
to produce sound and relevant research. Although issues
remain around data quality and consistency, they may not
be so acute to prevent any research from being done. 
As far as methods are concerned, although TEs can tackle
some of the main issues, a number of caveats are called
for. For example, letter treatments may end up having
unintended effects. Let us take the example of a ‘threat’
letter, signalling an increase in the probability of audit. If
taxpayers have always perceived a high probability of audit,
they would not respond by changing their behaviour.
Similarly, evaders may believe that the tax authority is
unable to uncover irregularities in their tax returns,
especially in developing countries where administrative
capacity may be low. Therefore, they would maintain their
dishonest behaviour even after receiving the letter.
Another example is a ‘social norms’ letter that informs
taxpayers that 90 per cent of the community complies
with the law and only a minority evades. Taxpayers may
believe, prior to receiving the letter, that almost everyone
complies. So the treatment may increase their perception
of evasion, leading them to adjust their behaviour to align
with the community and thus comply less rather than
more. In other words, the final result of treatments
depends on previous beliefs, as they affect the taxpayers’
response to the message they receive (Castro and
Scartascini 2014). 
In principle, good research design can help in preventing
some of these issues. However, this requires some degree
of commitment and flexibility from the RA to make sure
that the research project is successful. There may be
circumstances, particularly in low-income countries, where
the RA may be interested and willing to collaborate in the
research, but it is still constrained in several ways, for
example related to skilled employees, administrative
capacity or IT systems. This implies that their collaboration
with researchers can represent a significant burden, for
example in making data available in an adequate and
anonymised format. More than being an insurmountable
obstacle, this issue requires a realistic and pragmatic
approach, as well as adequate planning of research
activities to take these specific constraints into account. 
In addition to these general constraints, there may be
more practical challenges. For example, the message on
the letter should be salient, clear and concise. The standard
format of the RA letters to taxpayers may or may not
satisfy these requirements. If the message is not designed
properly, for example because the local authority is unable
to change its standard format, then the treatment may not
have any effect as ‘inattentive taxpayers’ may not even be
aware of it. In other words, ‘information matters but how
you present it does too’ (Castro and Scartascini 2014: 10).
This issue is fully preventable, for example through the use
of pictures, well-designed messages, or separate letters to
make the message more salient. However, there may be
cases where the tax authority is unable or unwilling to
adopt these measures. In other cases, the specific
constraints faced by the RA can be very basic and simple;
for example, it may not be possible in all countries to post
letters to physical addresses. In this case, researchers may
explore the possibility of delivering the message by other
means or using text messages.
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Similarly, clarity and simplicity is required in the
communication of research results to policymakers. Tax
experiments are sometimes complex, and the results may
be difficult to distil down to simple policy messages.
However, policymakers need precisely that, as well as
clear indications on what may work. A related issue
regards the fact that TEs are able to draw conclusions only
on a specific treatment, with a specific design, and in a
given context. This can result in experiments falling short
of giving the sort of ‘big picture’ answers that
policymakers often want. This issue was raised, in the
more general context of RCTs, by a World Bank blog4 that
underlined that much analysis is done on simple policy
tweaks that are sometimes isolated from the broader
context. One of the studies object to this criticism was
precisely a tax experiment conducted in Punjab (Khan et al.
2014), which analysed the effect of different incentives for
tax collectors to raise more revenue. The study was
criticised for abstracting from specific labour market
factors that tax collectors face, and from the possibility
that inspectors would, with time, find ways to circumvent
these incentives and make money out of them. 
Related to the need to be closely connected to the local
context, it is very important to take into account social
and cultural factors. Researchers need to be aware of and
respect social sensitivities, not only in tailoring the content
and form of letters. For example, Castro and Scartascini
(2014) underline how it may be appropriate to exclude
very poor neighbourhoods from experiments, to avoid
sending ‘threat’ messages to the poorest and most
vulnerable people who may face the hard choice of
feeding their children or paying tax. 
4 Conclusions 
This paper has reviewed recent TEs and discussed the
opportunities and challenges for expanding this type of
research in developing countries. While it is far from being
fully exhaustive, it leads to four concluding points. Firstly,
experimental research on tax compliance has been
advancing fast in recent years, allowing it to be better
placed to offer policy-relevant solutions than earlier TEs.
From a policy perspective, this makes TEs more attractive
as a relatively low-cost tool that RAs can use to evaluate
existing initiatives or to identify effective prospective
measures. The fact that the methods have already been
used in Europe and the US provides a good opportunity
to learn from the existing body of work. 
Secondly, despite these improvements there is still a gap as
far as low-income countries are concerned, and particularly
on the African continent. While this is due to relatively
recent developments in the modernisation and
digitalisation of tax administrations, there is now an
opportunity to expand this field of research to new
countries. Thirdly, when applying the methods to
developing countries it is necessary to keep in mind the
specific challenges that were highlighted in the previous
section. In addition to data availability and quality, one of
the most critical elements is the role of the local
authorities. This is a particular challenge in countries where
there is not a long tradition of collaboration between RAs
and the research community, and where capacity
constraints are high. The degree and quality of local
authorities’ involvement is a key element in determining
both success and failure of the experiment. It also
influences the usefulness of the results, i.e. whether they
are likely to be picked up by policymakers or not. One
possible way to ensure RA commitment is for research to
be demand-driven. In other words, it should respond to a
specific knowledge gap highlighted by the RA or a specific
demand for evaluation of a current or prospective policy
initiative. In this way, the TE can be built into the process
of decision-making as a source of knowledge and evidence. 
Finally, most of the difficulties described above can
potentially be addressed by good research design that is
both in line with the local context and conducive to
rigorous evidence. The recent digitalisation of RAs makes
it feasible to expand TE research in new contexts, which is
fully in line with the policy priority given to tax revenue
mobilisation in developing countries. Therefore, TEs have
the potential to become a useful evaluation tool to better
understand compliance and to improve the effectiveness
of tax administrations’ actions to tackle it. 
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Notes
1 For a detailed review, see Mascagni (2014). 
2 Defined as high in presence of self-reported income or rents
and royalties income, and low otherwise. 
3 For example, see Bosco and Mittone (1997); Coricelli, Rusconi and
Villeval (2014); Becker, Buchner and Sleeking (1987); Mittone (1997).
4 The blog post can be read at
http://blogs.worldbank.org/futuredevelopment/chief-minister-
posed-questions-we-couldn-t-answer.
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“Tax compliance is related to many of the common obstacles to tax mobilisation, such as lowaccountability and capacity constraints… One way in which the research community can help governmentsmobilise additional tax revenue is by understanding these constraints better and by evaluating possible ways to
overcome them. However, the evaluation of drivers and constraints to tax compliance suffers from a number of
methodological issues related mainly to the difficulty of measurement. [But] recent developments in
econometric methods and in the availability of data have created new opportunities to bring this field to the
frontier of research.”
